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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether there is evidence of 
performance persistence among 726 funds with net asset values 
denominated in Euros. The study is carried out on data ranging from April 
1992 to April 2009. Persistence is searched for in raw, risk adjusted and 
alpha performance. The results attained provide evidence for the 
distinguishing of performance persistence in the short term. In the long term 
there is no unison evidence for performance persistence. 
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1 Introduction and purpose 
 
 
This section paints a backdrop to the study. It gives a brief introduction to 
the subject of performance persistence as well as to the study. Moreover the 
purpose of the study will be stated. The segment is concluded with a short 
outline of the paper. 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Whether performance persistence can be discerned or not has been the focus 
of numerous studies over the past half-century. The reason for its popularity 
can be explained by a number of obvious appeals. The existence of 
persistence would discredit the fundamental hypothesis of the perfectly 
efficient market. As performance persistence implies that certain funds 
succeed in achieving excessive returns over long periods, its existence 
would strengthen the notion of the able fund manager picking the cherries of 
the market. Consequently it would justify the management fees charged by 
funds. 
 
This study investigates whether performance persistence exists among funds 
with net asset values denominated in Euros. The reason for the criteria that 
fund assets have to be denominated in Euros is to regard performance 
persistence from a European Union point of view, to investigate the 
circumstances which a European investor faces when investing in 
community currency assets. A persistence study of funds denominated in 
Euros, meaning funds that are available and feasible alternatives for the 
general European investor, has not been conducted on such a large number 
of funds as is done in this paper. Hopefully this study will shed a tiny sliver 
of light on the character of the European fund market. 
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1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether Euro-denominated funds 
display performance persistence. This will be determined by computing 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient on rankings of both raw data, data 
computed using the Treynor measure, as well as data computed using the 
Jensen measure. 
1.3 Outline 
Section 2 gives a short review of the European fund market. Section 3 
accounts for theories relevant to the study. Section 4 details a number of 
previous researches done on the subject. Section 5 describes the data sample 
used in the study. Section 6 gives account of the methodology of the study. 
Section 7 comprises a presentation of the results. In section 8 an analysis is 
made of the results. Section 9 concludes the study. 
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2 The European fund market 
 
 
The following is a report on the circumstances which the European fund 
market finds itself in right now. Furthermore this section gives a 
recollection of the development of the fund market over recent years, as 
well as presenting views on its future. 
 
 
In the following account of the European fund industry a distinction is made 
between UCITS-funds and non-UCITS funds. UCITS stands for 
Undertakings for Collective Investments In Transferable Securities. A 
UCITS-fund is encompassed by a number of European Union directives 
allowing it to conduct its business throughout the European Union. As this 
study views fund performance from the perspective of a general European 
investor, it is appropriate to especially point out the developments in a truly 
general and border-crossing fund type. 
 
At the end of 2008 European investments funds had assets of 6’142 billion 
Euros under management, of which 4’593 billion Euros, or 74.8% of the 
total European fund market, were attributable to UCITS-funds. During 2008 
total European fund assets decreased by 1,768 billion Euros, a 22.3% 
percent drop from the year before. For the whole of 2008 assets in the 
UCITS-fund category dropped by 25.4%, while non-UCITS funds s lost 
11.5%.
1
 
 
Concerning UCITS-fund assets, market losses made up 77% of the total 
decrease. Total net outflows, comprising sales and redemptions, amounted 
to 335 billion Euros, a figure summing to 6% of end of 2007 assets, a record 
amount. Quarterly outflows increased gradually throughout 2008 with a 
                                                 
1
 EFAMA, (February 2008), p. 2, 10. 
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fourth quarter net outflow of 142 billion Euros. As disruptions to the market 
reached enormous proportions in October with the fall of Lehman Brothers, 
so did net sales, amounting to 40% of 2007’s total outflows. Beginning with 
the governmental bailouts in November, outflows diminished greatly, some 
categories such as balanced, money market and equity funds even registered 
net inflows for the last two months.
2
 
In a report on the results of the European Investment Fund Industry for 
2008, the European Fund and Asset Management Association states that the 
largest difficulties for funds in 2008 were the crisis in financial markets, 
tougher competition from banks as well as fears of recession. All three 
factors caused investors to withdraw amounts from funds as well demanding 
fund services less. As banks scrambled to attract deposits to prop up their 
liquidity and governments rushed to guarantee bank deposits, the risk-free 
investment alternative to funds gained ground.
 3
 
 
Looking beyond last year, European investment funds have experienced a 
doubling of managed assets over the past ten years, as fund assets went from 
3,042 billion Euros in 1998 to 6,142 billion Euros in 2008. Concerning the 
outlook for the European fund industry, EFAMA points towards low interest 
rates, low valuations in the stock markets and growth potential in emerging 
markets, as possible factors which might contribute to the recovery of the 
industry. Said factors can assist in once again attracting investors to funds, 
nevertheless EFAMA is clear in its opinion that financial markets must clear 
before funds can register recovering net inflows.
4
 
                                                 
2
 EFAMA, (February 2008), p.  2, 5, 6, 8. 
3
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3 Theory 
 
 
This section presents theories and viewpoints relevant to the focus of this 
study. It clarifies the notional environment of performance persistence, and 
sheds light on the fundamental conflict between the possibilities of 
projecting future performances and the hypothesis that the marketplace is 
efficient, to varying degrees, with respect to information. 
 
3.1 The notion of performance persistence 
Performance persistence is the existence of a correlation between previous 
period performance and the performance in a following period.
5
 Such a 
relationship implies that there exists a possibility of predicting future 
performances of funds, equities etcetera, by analyzing their historical data. 
3.2 Efficient market hypothesis 
According to Jensen the simplest way of expressing whether market 
efficiency relative to a certain information set I exists, is that it is impossible 
to make a profit by trading on said information I.
6
 Rephrased, the efficient 
market hypothesis states that the current price of an asset incorporates all 
available information.
7
 The hypothesis is divided into three categories of 
efficiency; weak, semi-strong and strong. 
 
Tests for weak-form efficiency were the first carried out when research on 
the subject began, and have concluded that market efficiency exists in this 
                                                 
5
 Carhart & Carpenter & Lynch & Musto, (2002), p. 1453. 
6
 Jensen, (1978), p. 96. 
7
 Bodie & Merton, (2000), p. 206. 
Elton & Gruber & Brown & Goetzmann, (2007), p. 400. 
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range.
8
 A market with weak efficiency includes all information to be found 
in historical prices in its pricing of assets. In later years the first category of 
efficiency has come to include a broader span of testing for the 
predictability of returns. It now encompasses the prediction of future returns 
on the basis of past returns, dividends and interest rates.
9
 The absence of 
weak-form efficiency would mean that investors could achieve excess 
returns by studying historical prices and from that predict future price 
movements. 
 
The semi-strong efficient market includes all publically available 
information in prices. In later research semi-strong efficiency has come to 
include the promptness with which prices adjust to public information.
10
 
Common references made to market efficiency usually imply this type.
11
 
Category tests conducted assess whether prices adjust efficiently to for 
example annual statements, earnings reports, sales reports and statistical 
data on consumer confidence, just to name a few.
12
 Semi-strong form tests 
also go by the name of event studies. Such studies, which have grown 
increasingly important since the 1970s, document reactions of stock price to 
decisions made by companies. Examples are the conclusion that stock prices 
increase with dividend hikes and decrease with dividend cuts, and that the 
issuing of new stock usually affects stock prices negatively, while 
redemptions do just the opposite.
13
 Most event studies conducted conclude 
that stock prices adjust to altered outlooks within one day. Fama therefore 
concludes that markets can be considered, with few exceptions, semi-
strong.
14
 
 
                                                 
8
 Fama, (1970), p. 388. 
9
 Fama, (1991), p. 1576. 
10
 Fama, (1991), p. 1576-1577. 
Elton & Gruber & Brown & Goetzmann, (2007), p. 401. 
11
 Jensen, (1978), p. 97. 
12
 Fama, (1970), p. 383. 
13
 Fama, (1991), p. 1600. Fama refers to studies by Charest (1978), Ahrony and Swary 
(1980) and Asquith and Mullins (1983) on dividends, and studies by Asquith and Mullins 
(1986), Masulis and Korwar (1986) on the issuing of new stock. 
14
 Fama, (1991) p. 1601-1602. 
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Strong market efficiency would mean that all information, both public and 
private, is incorporated in the asset’s price. Tests assess whether any actor in 
the marketplace can make a profit on the basis of a monopoly on certain 
information. Fama suggests renaming such tests; tests for private 
information.
15
 The focus of such tests, which the reader might have 
concluded, is whether insiders can use their privileged information to 
achieve excess returns. Certain research lends support to the idea that strong 
efficiency does not completely exist in the marketplace. Insider trading, 
illegal nevertheless, is highly profitable, certain firms specializing in 
security analysis such as Value Line do have somewhat of an upper hand, 
and fund managers sometimes know before the market does.
16
 
3.3 Random walk hypothesis 
The random walk model assumes that there is independence among 
successive returns and that these distributed evenly over time. The return of 
each period is independent and unaffected by past returns.
17
 As the random 
walk model is intimately linked with the efficient market hypothesis they 
directly support each other’s stances. This link exists in that in efficient 
markets all information will immediately be incorporated into security 
prices. This “instantaneous adjustment”, which Fama refers to it as, has a 
certain element of vagueness to it, therefore over- and under-adjustments 
will huddle around the correct adjustment, which will be achieved on 
average. In addition, the time it takes for an original price to fully adjust to 
new information, is itself an independent and random variable. The 
independence and randomness lies in that some price adjustments will occur 
in anticipation, before the market actually takes part of the information, and 
others will straggle. The picture which Fama has painted of the efficient 
market’s adjustment to information is that of successive and independent 
price change. Characteristics, which he concludes, define a random walk 
                                                 
15
 Fama, (1991), p. 1576-1577. 
16
 Fama, (1991), p. 1603. 
17
 Elton & Gruber & Brown & Goetzmann, (2007), p. 403. 
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market.
18
 According to Fama the random walk model is valid as long as 
information on past prices cannot be used to make excess profits, implying 
that a minimum of weak-form efficiency must exist in the marketplace. This 
means that any investment strategy cannot be better and yield a higher 
return than just buying and holding.
19
 
 
As numerous tests have yielded support to the random walk hypothesis, 
Fama concludes his 1995 article by announcing a shift in the burden of 
proof of the fallibility of the random walk, to proponents of fundamental 
analysis. It is up to them to provide evidence that consistent excess returns 
are delivered.
20
 He states that fundamental analysis is of no additional value 
to the investor, unless he has possession of new information that prices have 
not yet adapted to. If there is no new information involved, random pickings 
of securities will according to the model yield a better result.
21
 The random 
walk hypothesis stands in direct contrast to the notion of performance 
persistence among funds. According to the model, any consistent 
achievements of excess returns should not be possible. 
3.4 Timing ability 
When attempting to explain fund performance, an investigation of timing 
abilities often is worth the while. The concept of timing ability is a method 
of measuring asset managers’ skills in reading the market and playing it 
accordingly. If an asset manager has a superior ability in interpreting market 
signals and indicators, he would be able to avoid bear markets while making 
full use of bull markets. If he expected a slump in the market, he would shift 
to lower beta alternatives in order to minimize losses. Conversely, when 
expecting a surge he would go heavier into higher beta assets as that would 
fully exploit profit possibilities.
22
 In figure 3.4, the able manager’s timing 
ability is illustrated by line a. In short, the possession of timing ability 
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 Fama, (1995), p. 76. 
19
 Fama, (1995), p. 76-77. 
20
 Fama, (1995), p. 78-79. 
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 Fama, (1995), p. 80. 
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 Elton & Gruber & Brown & Goetzmann, (2007), p. 651. 
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implies that managed assets would experience milder downturns and 
stronger upturns relative to the rest of the market. 
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       Fig. 3.4: Showing the theoretical plot of positive timing ability (a), negative 
timing ability (b), and the absence of timing ability (c). 
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4 Previous research 
 
 
This part of the study accounts for previous research done on the subject of 
performance persistence and performance analysis. Brief descriptions are 
given of the purposes of these studies as well as of the results attained. 
 
 
Mutual Fund Performance – Sharpe (1966) 
 
Observing a persistence of differences in performance among 34 funds 
between the years 1954 and 1963, Sharpe investigated three methods of 
predicting future performance. Data from between the years 1944 to 1953 
was used to compute fund rankings according to reward-to-variability ratios, 
the Treynor Index and expense ratios and size. These were then compared to 
reward-to-variability ratios for 1954 to 1963. Sharpe observed that when 
ranking funds after their reward-to-variability ratios, with a correlation 
coefficient of +0.3157 and a Spearman’s correlation coefficient of 0,360, 
those ranking low one year would probably rank low in later periods as 
well. A pattern that was recognized for high ranking funds as well. He 
concluded that the ratio could vaguely predict future performances. 
Rankings according to the Treynor Index based on 1944 to 1953 were an 
even better predictor with a correlation coefficient of +0.4008 and 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient of 0.454. Ranking according to the 
fund’s expense ratio yielded a correlation coefficient of -0.3746, while the 
correlation coefficient between fund size and performance was +0.1523. 
Sharpe concluded that even though past performances do matter slightly, 
persistence performance differences can be explained in large by differing 
expense ratios, supporting the concept of an efficient market. He went on to 
emphasize the necessity of further research. 
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French Mutual Fund Performance – Evaluation of Internationally 
Diversified Portfolios – McDonald (1973) 
 
The paper investigated monthly data between the years 1964 and 1969 of 
eight French funds. McDonald found that three out of eight funds had 
monthly returns of one percent or more than the systematic risk taken gave 
reason to expect. An additional three funds had such excess monthly returns 
in the range between one-half and one percent. The remaining two funds 
had risk-related excess returns marginally higher than zero. The study went 
on to conclude that fund managers were superior analysts in forecasting 
returns on French securities. McDonalds explains this partly with the 
perceived inefficiency of the French securities market to price in 
information, as well as the French banks’ and fund managers’ access to 
information. 
 
The Persistence of Mutual Fund Performance – Grinblatt, Titman (1992) 
 
The purpose of the study was to investigate whether there is persistence in 
fund performance. The sample set consisted of data between 1974 and 1984 
for 279 funds. The paper concluded that there is a positive persistence in 
performance. Mutual funds were expected to achieve a 0.28% abnormal 
return in the second five year period for every 1% abnormal return achieved 
in the first five year period. The study also showed that the 10% worst-
performing funds in the first five-year period delivered an abnormal 
performance of -3.5% per year in the next five year period. 
 
Hot Hands in Mutual Funds: Short-Run Persistence of Relative 
Performance, 1974-1988 – Hendricks, Patel, Zeckhauser (1993) 
 
The paper investigated quarterly data for a total of 165 funds between 1974 
and 1988. It concluded that there is short-term performance persistence in 
that funds having returned a 1% superior return in one four-quarter period, 
will deliver a superior growth of 3% in the next four quarters. Though 
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applied over an additional four quarters the return will fall to 2%. The study 
not only concludes the existence of hot hands, but also icy hands. Funds 
having generated inferior growth in the past year will continue to deliver 
disappointing performances. No constant super performers were observed, 
though continuous sub performers were recognized. 
 
Performance Persistence – Brown, Goetzmann (1995) 
 
The study encompassed 372 funds from 1976 to 1988. It found relative 
performance persistence even when adjusted for risk. The authors explain 
most of the persistence with funds lagging passive benchmarks. It was 
observed that while winners and losers usually maintain, rankings can 
sometimes reverse. Therefore the persistence is attributed in part to a 
common strategy among managers, leading to a correlation between their 
persistence, and in part by the survival of unremitting under performers. 
 
The Persistence of Risk-Adjusted Mutual Fund Performance – Elton, 
Gruber, Blake (1996) 
 
The authors studied data from 1977 through 1993 for 188 funds. The study 
concludes that there is a possibility of predicting future performance from 
previous ones. Those funds delivering good yields in the past will do so in 
the future as well. It is observed that the top decile of funds ranked by alpha 
values computed over three years, will deliver an excess return of 0.009% a 
month for the next three years. The bottom decile will conversely yield a 
negative return of -0.437% per month for the next three years. The top 
decile alpha ranked of funds outperformed the bottom decile funds eleven 
out of twelve times, as well as the average fund nine times out of twelve. 
When instead using alpha computed over one year to rank funds, the top 
decile funds yielded an excess return of 0.015% each month for the coming 
three years, while the bottom decile delivered -0.397%. The top decile 
outperformed the bottom decile fund as well as the average fund twelve out 
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twelve times. The top decile funds in a ranking according to alpha computed 
over one year, will deliver an excess return of 1.50% in next coming year. 
 
On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance – Carhart (1997) 
 
Carhart studied data from 1962 to 1993 for 1892 funds, with an average 
yearly sample size of 509 funds. He notices that even though winners and 
losers are likely to maintain their status, 80% of the top decile funds differ 
every year. He also observed that winners and losers often turn into their 
opposites the following year. The author interpreted the short period of time 
winners actually remain winners as evidence of the ephemeral character of 
excess returns. Nevertheless, Carhart concluded the existence of a short-
term performance persistence spanning over one year, which according to 
him, was explained rather by chance, common factors, expense ratios and 
transaction costs. In all he declared that, even though top performing funds 
stand a slightly above average chance of delivering excess returns the first 
following year, the only significant persistence is that of the worst under 
performers. 
 
Performance Persistence: Evidence for the European Mutual Funds Market 
– Grünbichler, Pleschiutschnig (1999) 
 
The data sample studied comprised monthly net asset values for a total 333 
European equity mutual funds between 1988 and 1998, of which 105 funds 
contributed with data for the all ten years. The authors found evidence for 
the existence of performance persistence. This persistence was observed to 
highly dependent on the time range studied, and was the strongest over six 
month periods. 
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Performance and Characteristics of Swedish Mutual Funds – Dahlquist, 
Engström, Söderlind (2000) 
 
The study encompassed 210 funds between the years 1992 through 1997. 
When investigating performance persistence, the study used the alpha values 
of the previous year to rank funds. The authors observed no persistence in 
performance among equity and bond funds. For money market funds 
however, a strong persistence was discerned. A winner of last year had a 
probability of 0.35 of remaining a winner in the following year, while a 
loser had probability of 0.25 of staying a loser. The authors note that 
without deducting fees, the probabilities are even higher. 
 
Performance Persistence of International Mutual Funds – Droms, Walker 
(2001) 
 
The study made use of data from 1977 to 1996 for a total of 529 funds. The 
authors found strong performance persistence in the short run. 57% of funds 
that were winners in Year 1 were winners in Year 2. Out of the Year 1 loser 
funds, 56% remained losers in Year 2. However, for longer evaluation 
periods of two, three and four years, performance persistence was not 
statistically significant. 
 
Do Winners Repeat with Style? – Ibbotson, Patel (2002) 
 
The data studied spanned from 1975 through 2000. The funds in the sample 
were adjusted for their style, meaning that fund profiles and investment 
objective were taken into consideration. Funds were ranked according to 
their alpha values. When winners were defined as those funds having a 
positive alpha both in the first and in the second period, 54% of winners 
repeat. The average alpha for winners in the second period was 1.51%. In a 
second analysis winners were defined as funds ranking in the top half in two 
successive periods. 54% of winners repeated, and the average alpha of 
winners in the second period was 1.50%. The authors went on to analyze 
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fund performances with winners defined on an absolute basis. When 
winners were defined as those funds having a first period alpha of at least 
1% and a positive second period alpha, the repeat win rate was 55%, with an 
average second period alpha of 1.74%. When winners had to have a first 
period alpha of at least 5% and a positive second period alpha, the repeat 
rate was 59% and the average second period alpha was 3.02%. The highest 
performance persistence was observed when winners were defined as funds 
having a minimum alpha of 10% in the first period and a positive second 
period. The repeat rate was 62% and the average successive period alpha 
was 4.29%. The third ranking method analyzed sorted funds by their relative 
alpha values. When winners were defined as the top 40% of funds with a top 
half alpha in the second period, 56% repeated with a second period average 
alpha of 1.86%. When the selection was narrowed to the top decile funds, 
61% of funds repeated and the average second period alpha was 3.41%. The 
strongest performance persistence was identified among the top 5% of 
funds. Among those 64% repeated their win, with a second period average 
alpha of 4.49%. The study therefore concluded that performance persistence 
exists. 
 
European Mutual Fund Performance – Otten, Bams (2002) 
 
The study covered 506 funds from 1991 through 1998. The authors first 
categorized funds according to their domicile. The funds were then ranked 
within their categories based on previous one-year returns and placed in 
portfolios in according to their rank. The discrepancy between excess 
returns for high-ranked portfolios and low-ranked portfolios varied from 
0.83% for French funds and 6.08% for UK funds. The alpha values for 
ranged between 0.71% and 7.28%. The authors concluded that there was 
only vague support for performance persistence, with the exception for UK 
funds. 
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5 Data 
 
 
This section specifies and gives reasons for the criteria with which the data 
was selected and describe the process of gathering the data. It also presents 
the data and variables used in the study, and accounts for their limitations. 
 
5.1 Data set 
The data collected encompasses the net asset values (NAV) of 726 funds 
between April 1992 and April 2009. Only funds with data spanning over the 
full seventeen years were included. Funds were selected on the criteria that 
the net asset value should be denominated in Euros. The fact that the net 
asset value is in Euros obviously does not imply that the fund is based in 
Europe, therefore the sample consists of funds from various parts of the 
world. As no differentiation was made between funds holding different asset 
classes, different ratios of assets or having special geographical focuses, the 
sample consists of a wide variety of fund types. This benefits the study as 
performance persistence is viewed from global perspective, albeit from a 
European window. The list of funds matching the stated criteria was 
collected by using Datastream Advance. This yielded a list of 726 funds, of 
which the monthly net asset values were gathered. These monthly net asset 
values take dividends and fees into consideration. Performance persistence 
was investigated using unadjusted fund data as well as data adjusted for risk. 
5.2 The risk-free return 
The risk-free return used in the latter computation was the one month 
EURIBOR. It is synthetic as the regular one month EURIBOR was not 
listed until December 1998. Data for the risk free interest rate was collected 
using Datastream Advance. 
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5.3 The market return 
For a European investor, the natural alternative to investing in funds 
denominated in Euros must logically be to invest in individual stocks or an 
index denominated in Euros. Therefore the benchmark used to compare 
fund returns to was the Dow Jones EURO STOXX 600, which provides a 
broad coverage of European large, mid and small capitalization companies. 
Monthly data for the benchmark was collected from Datastream Advance. 
5.4 Survivorship bias 
Survivorship bias occurs when data collected on funds only incorporates 
those funds which have survived the whole sample period. As funds which 
have closed down are not included, the worst underperformers are not taken 
into account in the study. As the bottom dwellers are removed the result is 
that overall performance seems better than it really is. In addition, there are 
numerous possible reasons for funds performing average or above average, 
one of which might be excessive risk taking. Consequently the surviving 
population might consist of a large portion of risky funds.
23
 Brown, 
Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross have demonstrated that a sample which is 
tainted by survivorship bias will yield a phony facade of performance 
persistence.
24
 Another side to the coin which is not emphasized as much is 
that funds on the opposite side of the spectrum, which have performed very 
well, merge with other funds or that the manager(s) leave and the fund 
closes, something which would bias the results negatively. 
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 Elton & Gruber & Brown & Goetzmann, (2007), pp. 428-429. 
Brown & Goetzmann & Ibbotson & Ross, (1992), pp. 560-561. 
24
 Brown & Goetzmann & Ibbotson & Ross, (1992), p. 561, 576. 
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6 Methodology 
 
 
This section describes and explains the methods used in the search for 
performance persistence. Certain essential concepts that are the focal points 
of the study are presented and described. We also delve into the individual 
theoretical backdrops of the methods utilized; the capital asset pricing 
model, the Treynor measure, the Jensen measure and Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient. 
 
6.1 Method 
First of all the raw performances of the funds are calculated by the method 
described under section 6.2. This study searches for performance persistence 
in data processed in three different ways; raw data on performances, 
performances as given by the Treynor measure, and performances as given 
by the Jensen measure. When the performance according to each of these 
methods has been calculated, the funds are sorted on a monthly basis 
according to the size of their monthly performances. Thereafter the 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is calculated for each month’s fund 
ranking, relative to the ranking the first month in the data sample. The 
purpose is to determine how alike the monthly performances of the funds, 
given by the monthly rankings, are to the funds’ performances the first 
month in the sample. If performance persistence exists, the changes in the 
rankings should be as small as possible. Perfect persistence would for 
example exist if the rankings have not changed at all since the first month.  
 
The point of using different methods for the computation of fund 
performance lies in that the different measures shed light on different 
aspects of fund management. The results will thus provide information 
concerning which aspects of funds’ performances it is that persist. 
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By incorporating raw performances we can determine whether funds are 
persistent in delivering absolute returns. By using the Treynor measure we 
can establish whether there is persistence in risk-adjusted returns. Utilizing 
the Jensen measure enables us to find out whether there is persistence 
among alpha returns. 
6.2 Definition of mutual fund performance 
A list of funds and their monthly net asset values between April 1992 and 
April 2009 was gathered. The net asset value readings were then utilized to 
calculate the percentage monthly returns for the funds as follows: 
 
RMONTH = (NAVT + 1 – NAVT) / NAVT 
6.3 The capital asset pricing model 
The capital asset pricing model is a method of pricing assets according to 
the amount of risk associated with them.
25
 The model is described by the 
following equation: 
 
)  ( FRMRiFRiR    
 
Where Ri is the expected return of asset i, RF is the risk-free return, βi is the 
beta-measure of asset i, and RM is the return of the market portfolio. 
 
The equation gives the security market line (SML), which describes the link 
between asset risk and return.
26
 Expected return differs depending on the 
amount of risk taken on. More assumed risk calls for higher expected 
returns. The measure of risk used in the capital asset pricing model, the beta 
measure, only covers systematic risk. That is risk which cannot be 
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26
 Haugen, (1997), p. 207. 
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eliminated by diversification. Therefore, the only taking of risk that the 
market rewards is that of systematic risk.
27
 
6.4 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient 
Spearman’s rank correlation yields a correlation coefficient ρ between -1 
and 1, signifying how well two rankings correlate. -1 would imply perfect 
negative correlation, 1 would indicate perfect positive correlation, while 0 
would mean an absence of correlation. 
)12( 
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Where ρ is Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, di is the numerical 
difference between the rankings of the values, and n denotes the number of 
ranked values. 
6.5 Performance measures 
Performance persistence research usually encompasses data both unadjusted 
and adjusted for risk. In this particular study fund returns were adjusted for 
risk by using the Treynor measure. When searching for persistence in 
performance relative to the selected benchmark, the Jensen measure was 
used. 
6.5.1 Treynor measure 
The Treynor measure gives the slope of the security market line mentioned 
in section 6.2 above. That is the line connecting the risky asset, in our case 
any of the 726 funds, and the risk-free rate which we have defined as the 
one month synthetic EURIBOR. The ratio gives a measurement of asset 
performance by placing the asset’s excess return compared to the risk-free 
alternative, in relation to the amount of systematic risk assumed by 
investing in that particular asset.
28
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 Elton & Gruber & Brown & Goetzmann, (2007), p. 291. 
28
 Hodges & Taylor & Yoder, (2003), p. 504. 
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Treynor measure = (RA – RF) / βA 
 
Where RA is the return of the asset, RF is the risk-free return and βA is the 
beta-coefficient of the asset. 
 
A weakness of the Treynor measure is that it does not take into 
consideration differences in assumed non-systematic risk. It only 
incorporates assumed market risk, i.e. systematic risk that cannot be 
eliminated by diversification. This is why it is said that the Treynor measure 
is insensitive to the breadth dimension of performance.
29
 The measure 
consequently supposes that the assets in question are part of a larger 
diversified portfolio, which eliminates the specific risks. 
6.5.2 Jensen measure 
The Jensen measure, also known as the Jensen differential performance 
index, Jensen ratio or Jensen’s alpha, gives a measure of performance 
relative to a benchmark, the security market line. It states the difference 
between an asset’s expected return and actual return. The expected return is 
computed using the capital asset pricing model, which specifies the return 
which is stipulated by the security market line. Graphically, the Jensen 
measure gives the vertical distance between a point on the security market 
line, corresponding to the asset’s assumed risk, and the asset’s actual return. 
In short, the Jensen measure quantifies the difference between the asset’s 
actual return and the return which it, according to CAPM, should deliver 
due to its risk.
30
 A fund with a positive Jensen measure indicates that the 
manager has an ability of picking winning assets which yield high returns 
relative to the risk they add to the fund. 
 
 AFMFA RRRRmeasureJensen  ) (       
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Where RA is the asset’s return, RF is the risk-free return, RM is the return of 
the market portfolio, and β is the beta measure of the asset. 
6.6 Searching for performance persistence 
All seventeen years of data was used to search for performance persistence 
unadjusted for risk, though as two years of data was used to compute a two-
year rolling beta value, the first risk adjusted values are observed for May 
1994. 
 
After a monthly Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient has been computed 
for every different way of searching for performance persistence, a two-
tailed hypothesis test will be conducted, either accepting or rejecting the null 
hypothesis that performance persists. 
 
N
X
Z
/

  
 
Where X is the average Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient over the 
sample period, µ equals zero. σ is the standard deviation of all the 
observations of Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient throughout the 
sample period, and N is the number of observations in the sample. 
 
The null hypothesis implies that the average correlation is zero, meaning 
that there is no performance persistence. The region for which we accept the 
null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance is between -1.96 standard 
deviation units and +1.96 standard deviation units. If the Z-value falls 
outside the acceptance region, i.e. if it either is larger or smaller than -1.96 
or +1.96, we reject the null hypothesis and accept H1. 
 
 27 
6.6.1 Unadjusted for risk 
The funds were ranked according to their performance on a monthly basis, 
for which the sample’s first month was consumed. Thereafter Spearman’s 
rank correlation coefficient, relative to the funds’ rankings in May 1992 
which was the first month with a computed performance, was calculated for 
every month starting with June 1992. The results are thus based on data 
between June 1992 and April 2009. 
6.6.2 Adjusted for risk using the Treynor measure 
As was explained under section 6.3.1, the Treynor measure is calculated by 
dividing a fund excess return over the risk-free return by the fund’s beta 
measure. Two years worth of data was deemed sufficient to create a reliable 
rolling beta value; consequently the initial two years of data collected, April 
1992 to April 1994, were used for this purpose. After the Treynor measure 
had been calculated for each fund they were ranked according to it. 
Thereafter the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient was calculated, 
beginning with May 1994. As Spearman’s needs one month to get started, 
so to say, the risk adjusted results are based on data between June 1994 and 
April 2009. 
6.6.3 Using the Jensen measure 
As the Jensen measure makes use of the beta measure in its computation the 
two initial years of data are used as a foundation to create a reliable beta 
value. Therefore the first month for which we can calculate a Jensen 
measure is May 1994. Since yet another month is used in order to calculate 
the first Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, our first data observation is 
for June 1994. The data sample consequently comprises June 1994 to April 
2009. After the Jensen measure was calculated for each fund, they were 
sorted by it on a monthly basis, after which Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient was calculated, referring back to the first month of the sample, 
which was June 1994. 
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6.7 Evaluating timing ability 
A test for the presence of timing ability among the sample funds was 
conducted by computing their total performance over the 16-year and 11-
month period between May 1992 and April 2009, and then ranking them 
according to it. Thereafter the funds in the top decile were selected, 
producing a collection of the 10% top performing funds, a sample of 73 
funds. Their monthly performances were then plotted against those of the 
benchmark, the Dow Jones EURO STOXX 600, over the same time period. 
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7 Results 
 
 
This section presents the results of the different tests for performance 
persistence carried out. Raw performance as well as performance adjusted 
for risk was analyzed, the latter by utilizing the Treynor measure. By using 
the Jensen measure the risk adjusted data was related to the benchmark, the 
Dow Jones EURO STOXX 600. Additionally a timing graph will illustrate 
the timing abilities found among the funds. 
 
7.1 Performance persistence, unadjusted for 
risk 
When the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is plotted over time, it can 
graphically be seen that the evidence in favor of performance persistence is 
nonexistent. The correlation coefficient never rises above 0.1. The only 
pattern which can be discerned is the correlation coefficient’s oscillation 
around zero. A pattern which is supported by the fact that the mean 
correlation coefficient over the 16 year and 11 month sample period is 
0.002795. 
 
Mean -0,0026945879 
Standard deviation 0,0378210424 
N 203 
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Fig. 7.1: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient – unadjusted for risk, June 
1992 to April 2009. 
 
In order to statistically determine whether there is evidence for performance 
persistence in the raw data we conduct a two-tailed hypothesis test at the 5% 
level of significance. As we mentioned above we accept the null hypothesis 
if our Z-value is either larger or smaller than -1.96  and +1.96. 
 
H0 = no performance persistence exists 
H§ = performance persistence exists 
 
01510,1
203/0378210424,0
00026945879,0


Z  
 
The computed Z-value of -1,01510 falls within the acceptance region of the 
null hypothesis. Therefore we accept the absence of performance 
persistence. 
7.2 Performance persistence using the Treynor 
measure 
When plotting Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient for the ranks of data 
computed using the Treynor measure, we can distinguish a clear downward 
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trend over the sample time period from initially quite high levels of 
correlation (0.89). The sloping trend eventually ends up oscillating in and 
out of negative territory. 
 
 
Fig. 7.2: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient – using Treynor’s measure, 
June 1994 to April 2009. 
 
Mean 0,1528600809 
Standard deviation 0,2398462385 
N 179 
 
By conducting a two-tailed hypothesis test at the 5% level of significance 
we can decide whether we should accept or reject the absence of 
performance persistence in data computed with the Treynor measure. 
 
H0 = no performance persistence exists 
H§ = performance persistence exists 
 
5268,8
179/2398462385,0
01528600809,0


Z  
 
Our Z-value of 8,5268 falls well within the rejection region of the null 
hypothesis. Consequently we accept H§, which signifies that performance 
persistence exists in this particular data. 
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7.3 Performance persistence using the Jensen 
measure 
When computing Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient on data attained 
by using the Jensen measure we get a highly oscillating (the standard 
deviation is 0.27) plotting over the sample period. However, the correlation 
stays at decent levels throughout the study, maintaining a mean value of 
0.35. 
 
 
Fig. 7.3: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient – using Jensen’s measure, 
June 1994 to April 2009. 
 
Mean 0,3484978707 
Standard deviation 0,2730509293 
N 179 
 
In order to statistically decide wheter there is performance persistence 
among data computed with the Jensen measure we run a two-tailed 
hypothesis test. 
 
H0 = no performance persistence exists 
H§ = performance persistence exists 
 
07586,17
179/2730509293,0
03484978707,0


Z  
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At the 5% level of significance we should reject the null hypothesis as our 
Z-value is well outside its acceptance region of ±1.96. We therefore 
conclude that performance persistence exists in the data computed using the 
Jensen measure. 
7.4 Timing 
The raw monthly returns between May 1992 and April 2009, of the 73 funds 
in the top decile and of the benchmark, the Dow Jones EURO STOXX 600 
were plotted against each other, yielding the result presented in figure 7.4 
below. 
 
 
Fig. 7.4: Plottings of the performances of the 73 top decile funds against the 
benchmark showing no evidence of timing abilities. 
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8 Analysis 
 
 
This section interprets the results attained above in order to draw 
conclusions from them. The results will also be put in relation to previous 
research on the subject of performance persistence and the efficient market 
hypothesis. We also consider other implications of the results and round 
things off by reflecting on the effects of a tumultuous market on persistence.
 
8.1 Analysis of results 
8.1.1 Raw results 
The results for the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient computed on 
rankings of raw data, does not leave room for any other conclusion than that 
there does not exist any performance persistence. 
8.1.2 Results attained using the Treynor measure 
The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient for the rankings of fund 
performances computed by using the Treynor measure, demonstrate quite a 
defined pattern. The correlation starts of being high (0.89) and ends low, 
even negative, after 14 years and 11 months. The results show that there is 
noteworthy short term performance persistence during the initial couple of 
months. This implies that funds which achieve returns in excess of the risk-
free rate, placed in relation to the amount of market risk they have assumed, 
do succeed in maintaining their pole position. It means that there exists an 
ability among fund managers to allocate capital in a manner which yields 
excess returns, though only in the short run.  
 
When the results over the whole sample time period are studied, there is no 
explicit evidence for performance persistence in the long run. Within the 
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first year the correlation between the ranks fell to the weak levels of 0.31. 
Even though the correlation did pick up somewhat in the coming couple of 
years it never rose above 0.6 again. In 1998, after four years, it once and for 
all continued its downward journey. This reinforces the notion that excess 
returns cannot be sustainably achieved in the longer run. 
8.1.3 Results attained using the Jensen measure 
Among funds which deliver returns in excess of what is expected of them 
from the capital asset pricing model, the evidence for performance 
persistence is quite volatile. Correlation swings are large, though they occur 
over a relatively high mean of 0.35. Over longer periods of time the monthly 
rankings of Jensen measure performances exhibit correlation which is 
higher than that found for the Treynor data. It is quite remarkable that the 
ranking for the month of June 2008 has a 0.8 correlation with the same 
month fourteen years earlier. The results imply that funds achieving alpha 
returns in relation to their theoretical CAPM returns hold an ability to 
maintain these returns over longer periods. Of course, the fluctuations in the 
correlation could mean that funds delivering alpha returns one month might 
eradicate all or much of their accumulated performance the next month, 
when they are ranked among the losers. 
8.2 Results and previous research 
Most studies conducted on performance persistence support some kind for 
persistence, especially short-term. This study is no exception, as the results 
attained support the notion of short-term risk-adjusted performance 
persistence. Correlation is the highest in the immediately following months. 
These results are consistent with a fair number of previous researches. 
Hendricks et al. (1993) attained the results that overachievers of one year 
will persist for the next, but no more. Carhart (1997) reached the same 
conclusion; risk-adjusted performance persistence is mostly short-term. 
Grünbichler et al. (1999) concluded that persistence was the strongest over 
one year, as did Droms et al. (2001). There is a notable difference between 
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the researches just mentioned and this study. While they conclude short-
term performance persistence over a one-year period, this study concludes 
the same, though with the adjustment that it is the strongest over the first 
few months. In this research no long term risk-adjusted performance 
persistence was observed, correlation entered into a long term downward 
trend from the first month. This finding too, is consistent with the results of 
the researchers just referred to. It serves to mention Hendricks et al. (1993) 
who did not discern any long term performance persistence, except among 
losers. However, Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996) found that past risk-
adjusted performance can be used to predict not only short-term future 
performances but also long-term. This result is not compatible with that 
found in this study, which indicates that the predictive value of historical 
performances decreases steadily over time. 
8.3 Results and efficient market hypothesis 
As was mentioned under section 3.2, an efficient market implies that it is 
impossible to achieve excess returns consistently, as all information is 
disseminated and incorporated into current asset prices. When analyzing the 
results of the raw rankings the efficient market hypothesis holds. Correlation 
is next to none, meaning that previous rankings cannot be utilized to predict 
future returns. 
 
The rankings of Treynor measure performances initially display high 
performance persistence. This means that the efficient market hypothesis 
does not hold in the short run for funds delivering returns in excess of the 
risk-free rate, relative to their risk level. Putting it crudely, it is possible to 
pick last month’s risk adjusted winner, and roughly have an 89% chance of 
receiving excess risk adjusted returns the first month, and a 76% chance of 
excess returns the second month. In the longer run the performance 
persistence falls even to negative levels, therefore in a longer perspective the 
efficient market hypothesis holds. The results illustrate that is not possible 
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to achieve excessive returns consistently for longer periods of time, which is 
in line with the notion of market efficiency. 
 
I find the results attained using Jensen measure performance to be the most 
interesting. The Jensen measure is, as was explained under section 6.3.2.2, a 
measure of the alpha return achieved over the expected return as is given by 
CAPM. The Jensen alpha can be used to measure how good a fund is at 
picking winners that yield higher returns for the same risk as the market. 
The results that correlation among Jensen measure rankings is quite high 
throughout the data period, albeit with a decent amount of volatility, implies 
that alpha achievers among funds are reasonably able to maintain their skill 
of picking assets which give excess returns in relation to their risk level. 
This result does not go well with the notion of strong-form market 
efficiency. In direct contrast to the hypothesis, it shows that certain funds to 
some extent have an upper hand, a superior ability of picking investments. 
8.4 Timing ability results 
It was of interest to conduct a test for timing ability as it could provide us 
with some explanation of the existence of performance persistence. 
Evidence in favor of timing ability would indicate that exceptional fund 
performance is due to fund managers’ superior abilities, that observed 
excess returns are not just the result of haphazard luck. Figure 7.4 is 
perfectly in line with the absence of market timing abilities. Except for a 
tiny number of notable exceptions yielding large excess returns while the 
market return is low and even negative, there is no graphical evidence of a 
curvature of the RA versus RM plots. 
8.5 The effect of extraordinary circumstances 
Bearing in mind the present turbulent circumstances on the financial 
markets of the world, it would be quite interesting to observe how the notion 
of performance persistence fares when there are structural shifts in the 
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marketplaces. Both situations involve market circumstances during which 
certain assets fared particularly well, in hindsight on lose grounds. 
8.5.1 The dotcom bubble 
In March 2000 a bubble which had gained momentum for the past five years 
burst. Stocks which had been pushed higher and higher on speculative and 
flimsy grounds plummeted. When ranking the 726 European funds 
according to their monthly performances as given by the Treynor measure, 
and then computing the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between 
their ranking in February 2000 and the following months we get the results 
plotted in figure 8.6.1. 
 
The results are not surprising as tech-stocks and investing funds registering 
excellent performances at the pinnacle of the bubble in February 2000, 
would find themselves ranked among the loser funds. Correlation between 
the ranking in February 2000 and the following couple of years should 
notionally be very low. 
 
 
Fig. 8.6.1: Spearman’s from the start of the dotcom bubble in March 2000. 
 
From the plotting in figure 8.6.1 we can note that the correlation drops 
rapidly the first year and second year after the burst. The correlation lands 
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around zero, implying, quite expectedly, that the performances of funds in 
February 2000 does not provide any clues or hints whatsoever to later 
performances. 
8.5.2 The subprime crisis 
In June of 2007 what would come to be known as the subprime crisis began 
with the collapse of two Bear Stearns hedge funds. This marked the 
beginning of a massive downturn in the world’s financial markets. By 
ranking the funds according to their Treynor measure, and then computing 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient using May 2006 as the base month, 
we can plot the diagram depicted in figure 8.6.2 a. 
 
 
Fig. 8.6.2 a: Spearman’s from the start of the subprime crisis in June 2006. 
 
The expected decline in the correlation between the rankings is comparable 
to that of the dotcom bubble. In fact, if the Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficients for both meltdowns are plotted together for the initial 23 months 
after the start of each crisis, we can more easily compare the development of 
the correlation. 
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Fig. 8.6.2 b: The development of Spearman’s, during the first 23 months 
after the start of each crisis, for the funds during the dotcom bubble and the 
subprime crisis. 
 
Figure 8.6.2 b clearly illustrates that rank correlation falls quite rapidly both 
during the initial 23 months of both the dotcom bubble and the subprime 
crisis. During both periods the correlation starts of a quite high levels, 
around 0.8, and then quickly makes its way to around zero. Although during 
the dotcom bubble the descent was somewhat more rapid, and 23 months 
was more than enough for it to become negative. 
 
The conclusion which can be drawn from the developments of the rank 
correlation coefficients during the dotcom bubble and the subprime crisis, is 
that volatile times toss the funds around in the rankings. A previous ranking 
does not contribute any useful information to what future rankings will be 
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9 Conclusion 
 
 
This section concludes the results attained in the study and provides  
comments by the author.
 
The results attained provide evidence that Risk-adjusted performance 
persistence exists in the very short term. Evidence of alpha-return 
performance persistence is ambiguous, though indicates that there might be 
persistence over longer periods of time. Any persistence observed is not the 
result of the timing abilities of the funds. During tumultuous circumstances 
in the financial markets rank correlation drops quickly, expectedly so since 
former winners often are sold off. 
 
There are many possible explanations for persistence only to be observable 
in the shorter term. Quite plausibly, funds heavily invested in certain assets 
which perform well one month will be equally heavy invested the following 
month, during which the assets can perform well once again due to a 
number of factors. Such factors could be momentum, a trend, or a temporary 
high demand for certain assets. An illustration of this could be that the price 
of a raw material rises significantly and consistently over a few months. 
Naturally any number of products or materials can be substituted for the raw 
material, for example banking services, loan provisions, IT services, IT 
manufacturing. Companies with ties to this material as well as funds 
focusing their investments on this material would most experience an 
increase in their market capitalization over the same months. Consequently 
funds as well as in companies related to the material will experience 
persistence in their performance over those months. That is, until the assets 
turn sour at which point the performance of the fund will do the same, and it 
will find itself among the losers. A possible focus of future studies could be 
to determine how long funds can maintain their rank within a certain decile, 
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and how big the average movement in the ranking is when they drop outside 
that decile. 
 
Another explanation for the non-existence of longer term persistence, as 
well as timing, are fund specific rules setting boundaries for the manager’s 
liberty to act freely on the basis of his judgment of financial circumstances. 
Most funds are required by law to keep investments in single position under 
a certain percentage of the fund’s total assets. Moreover, many if not most 
funds have outspoken guidelines by which they must adhere, often related to 
the fund’s investment profile. A balanced fund for example, probably is 
required by its own statute to maintain a certain ratio between equities and 
bonds. A fund profiling itself as aggressive most probably cannot sell all of 
its equity assets and take up positions in bonds just because the managers 
fears a bear market. Such a course of action would probably violate the 
fund’s internal statutes, as well deter possible investors since the fund is not 
true to its profile. Such legislative regulations, as well as internal statutes 
and profiles, hinder fund managers from taking full advantage of bull 
markets, avoid bear markets and move away from investments industries 
and materials that have performed well but are about to fall back. Ibbotson 
and Patel (2002) researched performance persistence in funds adjusted for 
their style, though the study only included funds with varying equity 
profiles. Mixed, balanced, bond, international and sector funds were 
excluded. An investigation of performance persistence among funds with 
very narrow investment profiles would be a possible objective of future 
research. Rationally, it is when boundaries and terms for investments are the 
most narrow that managerial skill plays the largest role. And is that not what 
research of performance persistence is all about? Finding out whether the 
ability of beating the market exists? 
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